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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to analyse the official discourse by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the 
Rogun Dam issue with a constructivist approach in order to find out whether the discourse 
invokes conflict rhetoric. It analyses official statements from 2012 to 2015. The Rogun 
Dam project is a hydropower project that was developed during Soviet times, but its 
construction was halted when the Soviet Union collapsed. Recently, the Tajik government 
announced its desire to resume the construction of the Rogun Dam in order to generate 
hydropower for economic purposes. Uzbekistan, as a riparian of the water flowing from 
Tajikistan, fiercely objected the construction plans. Therefore, the World Bank was asked to 
undertake feasibility studies on the hydropower project. As the feasibility studies 
proceeded, Uzbekistan appeared to seek different ways to oppose the construction of the 
Rogun Dam. In 2012, both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan appeared to be offensive towards each 
other in their official statements when mentioning the Rogun Dam. Over the course of time 
researched, tones towards each other softened. Both countries were also able to improve 
their bilateral relations on other issues than the Rogun Dam at the end of the period 
researched. Therefore, this thesis concludes that the official discourse on the Rogun Dam by 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan does not invoke conflict rhetoric. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, the relations between the former Soviet states 
changed dramatically. The independence and sovereignty of the fifteen former Soviet states 
caused a change in the identity of all countries, which resulted in new national interests and 
changing international relations within the post-Soviet space. This was also the case for the 
Central Asian region (CAR), which consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. When the countries within the CAR were part of the Soviet 
Union, they cooperated very closely. However, in the post-Soviet era, they appeared to be 
rather competitive when they became independent states.1  
This competitive attitude was also reflected in the bilateral relations between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan after Tajikistan announced its plans to resume the construction of 
the Rogun Dam. This is a dam project, which was planned to be constructed in Soviet times, 
but when the Soviet Union collapsed, the plans were suspended and the construction was 
halted as Tajikistan suffered from a civil war from 1992 to 1997.2 But as the country was 
recovering from turbulent times, Dushanbe announced its plans to resume the construction 
of the big dam project. The main reason for Tajikistan to resume the construction was that 
the Rogun Dam could solve the country’s energy shortages and strengthen Tajikistan 
economically through hydropower production and export.3 But the Tajik plans to resume 
the construction of the dam project were met with concerns by Tashkent, since Uzbekistan 
is a riparian state of the water that flows from Tajikistan and therefore the country could be 
affected by the operation of the Rogun Dam.4  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A. Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: new geopolitics, old regional order,” International 
Affairs 80 (2004), 486-501.	  
2 S. Horsman, “Uzbekistan’s Involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-1997: Domestic 
considerations.” Central Asian Survey 18 (1999), 37-38. 3	  S. Ito, S. El Khatib and M. Nakayama. “Conflict over a hydropower plant project between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.” International Journal of Water resources development. (2015), 
3; World Bank, “Key issues for Consideration in the Proposed Rogun Hydropower Project,” 
Draft for discussion, 2014, 5.	  
4 World Bank, “Key issues for Consideration,” 6. A. Kamilov,“Address by the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan H.E. Mr. Abdulaziz Kamilov at the 68th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” New York, 27 September 2013; G. 
Saidova, Letter from the Uzbek government to the World Bank, November 7, 2012; R. 
Nurshayeva, “Uzbek leader sounds warning over Central Asia water disputes,” Reuters, 
September 7, 2012. Accessed February 23, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/centralasia-water-idUSL6E8K793I20120907 . 
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 The concerns of Uzbekistan led Tajikistan to ask for international involvement in the 
construction plans of the Rogun Dam. The World Bank (WB) agreed to undertake 
feasibility studies on the dam project, which were finalized in 2014. As the WB was 
proceeding with its studies on the feasibility of the Rogun Dam, Uzbekistan expressed more 
and more concerns.5  
 In academic research and in media sources, the Rogun Dam issue is described as one 
of the biggest problems affecting the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.6 
This thesis seeks to research how the Rogun Dam issue has been used in the official 
discourse of both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in order to find out whether the Rogun Dam 
issue is as heavily disputed as described in the literature. This brings us to the research 
question of this thesis: To what extent does the official discourse on the Rogun Dam issue 
by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan invoke conflict rhetoric? The thesis researches this issue over 
the course of 2012 to 2015. This limited timeframe is chosen because it allows going more 
into detail on the issue. It was also during this period that the Rogun Dam was heavily 
discussed by both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, since the WB was wrapping up its feasibility 
study during this period. 
It is of importance to look into discourse in international relations, since discursive 
power can be used to reproduce the political reality in international relations. This means 
that discourse on a certain issue between countries can produce a conflict reality. The 
distribution of ideas and thus language is considered to be the starting point for a conflict 
reality. However, this is not necessary. Discourse can also be used to create a narrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 UN Radio, “Malye GES- Klyuch k vodnomu balansu v Tsentral’noi Azii: Intervyu s 
zamministrom po vodnomu hozaistvu Uzbekistana,” March 21, 2013. Accessed February 
23, 2016, http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/russian/archives/134616/; Nurshayeva, 
“Uzbek leader sounds warning over Central Asia water disputes,”; Saidova, Letter from the 
Uzbek government to the World Bank.  
6 B.R. Eschanov et al., “Rogun Dam- Path to Energy Independence or Security Threat?” 
Sustainability 3 (2011): 1573-1592; B. Abdolvand et al. “The dimension of water in Central 
Asia: security concerns and the long road of capacity building.” Environ Earth Sci 73 
(2015): 897-912; C. Putz, “Uzbekistan Still hates the Rogun Dam Project.” The Diplomat 
August 4, 2015. Accessed February 24, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/uzbekistan-
still-hates-the-rogun-dam-project/; D. Trilling,“Tajikistan: World Bank Gives Dam Green 
Light; Rights Watchdog Worried,” Eurasianet June 26, 2014. Accessed February 23, 2016, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68761; G. Voloshin, “The Uzbek-Tajik dentente, can it 
last?” CACI-Analyst July 8, 2015. Accessed February 24, 2016, 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13247-uzbek-tajik-detente-
can-it-last.html. 
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rather than a political reality in order to support the identity of a country.7 The study of 
discourses in international relations allows a researcher to observe change in relations 
between specific countries. This is also what this thesis attempts to do, seeking for change 
in the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan by treating the discourse on the 
Rogun Dam issue by both countries as an independent variable. 
The issue of the Rogun Dam has already been discussed in scholarly research.8 The 
literature, which discusses the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is 
rather marginal. Filipo Menga and Mohira Suyarkulova wrote on how the Rogun Dam has 
been used for Tajikistan in order to build a nation.9 Menga argues in his research that the 
Rogun Dam is used for symbolic and social power.10 Suyarkulova focuses on the discourse 
by Tajik elite in Tajikistan on the Rogun Dam.11 Other scholars have focussed mainly on 
analysing the conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and proposed solutions for 
resolving the dispute over the Rogun Dam between both countries.12 However, all of this 
research already assumed that the Rogun Dam issue is one of the biggest issues in the 
bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Therefore, it is also important to take 
a step back and consider to what extent the Rogun Dam issue is actually changing the 
bilateral reality between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This thesis attempts to take that step 
back. Furthermore, none of the research on the Rogun Dam issue has focussed on the 
official discourse of both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the Rogun Dam issue and how they 
create a narrative around the Rogun Dam issue in their bilateral relations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A. Wendt, “On the Via Media: a response to the critics,” Review of International Studies 
26 (2000), 166-167. 
8 F. Menga, “Building a nation through a dam: The case of Rogun in Tajikistan,” 
Nationalities Papers 43 (2015), 479-494; E.A. Borisova, “Spory vokrug Rogunskoy GES,” 
Istoriya i Sovremennost’ 1 (2011): 93-106; Ito, El Khatib and Nakayama. “Conflict over a 
hydropower plant project between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,” 1-16; Melnikovova, L., B. 
Havrland and R. Valencik. ”Rogun – Hydropower Generating Controversy in Central 
Asia.” Acta Universtatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis 62 (2014): 
1353- 1361; M. Suyarkulova, “Between national idea and international conflict: The 
Roghun HPP as an anti-colonial endeavor, body of the nation, and national wealth,” Water 
Hist 6 (2014):  367-383. 
9 Menga, “Building a nation through a dam,” 479-494; Suyarkulova, “Between national idea 
and international conflict,” 367-383. 
10 Menga, “Building a nation through a dam,” 479-494. 
11 Suyarkulova, “Between national idea and international conflict,” 367-383. 
12 Borisova, “Spory vokrug Rogunskoy GES,” 93-106; Ito, El Khatib and Nakayama, 
“Conflict over a hydropower plant project between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,” 1-16; 
Melnikovova, Havrland and Valencik, ”Rogun – Hydropower Generating Controversy in 
Central Asia,” 1353- 1361.	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The thesis uses a constructivist lens in order to analyse the discourse in the bilateral 
relations of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the Rogun Dam issue and argues that the official 
discourse on the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan does not invoke 
conflict rhetoric. Both countries make offensive official statements towards each other, but 
throughout the time researched the official statements on the Rogun Dam matter soften 
increasingly. Furthermore, at the end of the period researched, both countries were even 
able to improve their bilateral relations on other areas than the Rogun Dam issue.  
The thesis is structured as follows: first, the theoretical framework and the 
methodology will be laid out in order to structure findings of the research and to discuss a 
theoretical approach that will be used to analyse the data which is discussed in the thesis. 
This is followed by a discussion on regionalism in Central Asia in order to gain more 
knowledge on the regional context of the CAR. Then the official statements by both 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will be discussed and analysed through a constructivist lens.  
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2. Theoretical framework and methodology 
 
This chapter discusses the theoretical approach and the methodology used to analyse the 
impact of the Rogun Dam issue on the international relation between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. A constructivist approach will be used in this thesis. Below the general ideas of 
the constructivist school are presented. This is followed by a methodology. 
 
2.1 Constructivism 
The constructivist school was established as a response to the limited scope that the 
neorealist and neoliberal schools present in world politics.13 Both schools are rationalist 
schools, which means that they treat states’ identities as given factors in world politics.14 
The constructivist school is mainly concerned with the social aspect of international 
relations. According to constructivist scholars, the rationalists leave out the ideological 
reasons for states to act. The constructivist school challenges the assumptions of both 
schools.15 According to both theories, there exists a structure in the international system, 
which is rather fixed.  States act out of an uncertainty and therefore their primary interest is 
survival, but they ignore the historical aspect of the states’ identities and how states are 
driven towards action through their historical development.16 Constructivists state that both 
the actors of the international system and thus the international system it self are changing 
factors.17 States act according to their identity, not only according to their means of power, 
like the rationalists state. They might be self-interested, but their interests change over time, 
because states’ identities change.18 Moreover, the constructivist school also considers the 
historical factor in its approach towards world politics. 
 Just like in the other leading schools in international relations, power plays a central 
role in the constructivist school. However, constructivists define power differently than the 
rationalists. The rationalists assume material power to be the most important power in world 
politics. With material power is referred to states’ physical actions. This does not mean that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 S. Brincat, “Towards a social-relational dialectic for world politics,” European Journal of 
International Relations 17 (2010), 687.  
14 A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization 46 (1992), 391-392. 
15 M. Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002, 3.  
16 Ibid.; Brincat, “Towards a social-relational dialectic for world politics,” 688. 
17 T. Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 
International Security 23 (1998), 181.  
18 Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, 4.	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the realists and the liberalists do not take state behaviour and identity into account, but 
identity is secondary in considering state power and state actions according to both 
schools.19 According to the constructivists, this is not the case, because next to material 
power, there also exists discursive power, which is of great importance to state behaviour. 
Discursive power refers to the power of discourse used by states. According to them, the 
material power is given meaning to by the social context in which they are interpreted by 
the actors in international politics.20 Actors thus use language in the international system in 
order to construct a political reality. This expands the concept of power to a more realistic 
view of power in modern world politics, since material power is not the only source of 
power used in world politics. 
The constructivist school makes the assumption, just like the rationalists, that there 
exists anarchy in the international system, however, this is, how Alexander Wendt, one of 
the leading constructivist scholars, phrased it “what states make of it.”21 This also has to do 
with the identity of states in the international system. The structure of the international 
system depends on the behaviour of the actors in the international system.22  The behaviour 
of states is driven by norms. Norms establish the identities of the actors in the international 
system, according to the constructivist school. A change of norms also constitutes a change 
of identity of the actors in the international system.23 States’ identities change over time, 
which means, according to the constructivist school, that the international system is also 
subject to change since the international system consists of state actions. International and 
domestic policies are thus inseparable from each other. 
When it comes to interests of states, neorealism assumes that states all have the 
same a priori interests, which are derived from their main interest to survive, which leads to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 E. Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European 
Journal of International Relations 3 (1997), 322. 
20 A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 1999, 139; Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground,” 330; J.T. Checkel, “The 
Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” World Politics 50 (1998), 326. 
21 A. Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization 46 (1992), 391-425. 
22 R. Koslowski and F.V. Kratchowil, “Understanding Change in International Politics: The 
Soviet Empire’s Demise and the International System,” International Organization 48 
(1994), 216-223. 
23 Ibid., 222-223. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” 
327-328.	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self-help among states.24 Constructivists also assume that states take action according to 
their interests. However, constructivists do not consider states having the same interests, 
since states’ identities differ significantly, according to their development.25  Furthermore, 
according to the constructivist school, states have more choices to take action than 
neorealists assume, since states’ actions do not depend on only one primary interest, but 
also on their identity. Choices that states are able to make are also constrained by their 
identity, according to the constructivist school.26 The identity of states partly decides how 
an actor in the international system responses to changing material circumstances.27 
According to the constructivists, states’ identities are thus formed by their historical 
development and this is reflected in their actions in the international system. Interactions of 
the states form the international system.  
 Above, the basic assumptions of the constructivist school are presented. However, 
the constructivist school is not a unified theory, like other prominent theories in 
international relations.28 Different scholars define different subgroups within the 
constructivist school. Ted Hopf, a leading constructivist, identifies two main groups within 
the constructivist school, which are the conventional group and the critical constructivists.  
The conventional constructivists’ aim is to present an alternative theory on the mainstream 
international relations theory, such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. They try to 
find the so-called “middle ground” between the mainstream theories of international 
relations. Their approach to international politics is rather positivist. The critical 
constructivists identify themselves more with the critical social theory.29 The conventional 
constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt and Jeffrey T. Checkel define states as having 
identities that are rather fixed. They emphasise that it is hard to change the identity of a 
state and that it is not likely, but possible.30 Critical constructivists state that the 
development of states is never completed. They argue that the conventional constructivists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 R.E. Keohane ed., Neorealism and its Critics, Columbia University Press: New York, 
1986, 102-108. 
25 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism,” 176. 
26 Ibid., 177. 
27 J.K. Jacobsen, “Duelling constructivisms: a post-mortem on the ideas debate in 
mainstream IR/IPE,” Review of International Studies 29 (2003), 47. 
28 Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, 6-7. 
29 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism,” 172. 
30 Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory,” 346; Wendt, Social 
Theory of International Politics, 339. 
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leave out the domestic factors of identity of states.31 The constructivist school thus appears 
to be a diversified school in international relations although they all share the assumption 
that the mainstream theories in international relations left the social part of international 
relations mainly out.32  
 There exists no single method of analysis of international relations. However, the 
constructivist school’s most significant character is that international relations are basically 
socially constructed. This assumption is also an important assumption in this thesis. It treats 
the foreign policies of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as a result of their identities. This thesis is 
rather leaning towards Hopf’s conventional constructivism in its approach, since it 
approaches the subject rather in a positivist way. The thesis uses language, just like the 
conventional constructivists, to see how the actors Tajikistan and Uzbekistan use the Rogun 
Dam in their discourse in order to find out how they construct their understanding of their 
bilateral relations. Furthermore, the thesis assumes states as dynamic in their identity to a 
certain extent. It does believe that a change of identity is possible, but it assumes that 
identity change takes time, as the critical constructivists argue.    
The relations among the Central Asian states have changed in their struggle towards 
taking on a new identity when the Soviet Union collapsed. This also caused that the 
bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan changed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The Rogun Dam plans were already developed in the Soviet Union with mutual 
agreement of both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. But when the Soviet Union collapsed, the 
views on the construction plans of the dam have changed. Views on the Rogun Dam 
construction plan have thus also changed through identity change, is what this thesis argues. 
Furthermore, the choice for the explicit conventionalist turn in constructivism is because the 
thesis aims to only to look into the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without 
taking in consideration the domestic backgrounds into detail, but only in a limited way in 
order to be able to focus on the bilateral relations on the international stage between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It offers a state-centric perspective on the Tajik-Uzbek relations 
and how they are affected by the plans for resuming the construction of the Rogun Dam. 
This means that the thesis is interested in how both countries construct their understanding 
of their bilateral relations. The reason that it offers solely a state-centric view on the Tajik-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Y.C. Cho, “Conventional and Critical Constructivist Approaches to National Security: An 
Analytical Survey,” The Korean Journal of International Relations 49 (2009), 87-90; K.	  
Devine, “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social 
Constructivist Framework,” International Political Science Review 29 (2008), 463. 
32 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 4.	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Uzbek relations is because states are considered to be the ultimate decision-makers in 
international politics. There exists no single explanation for the actors’ behaviour, since, 
according to the constructivist school, actions depend on identity, which means that they 
depend on the context and interpretation of the researcher. This means that there is no 
objective explanation possible, also in the case of the relation between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan and the impact of the plans to resume the construction of the Rogun Dam.  
 
2.2 Methodology 
The thesis seeks to gain a better understanding of the Tajik-Uzbek relations. The reason that 
I chose for a single case study is because it allows one to gain more detailed information 
about this specific case, which results in a deeper understanding of that specific case.33 In 
order to analyse the Tajik-Uzbek relations over the Rogun Dam issue, the constructivist 
approach is being used as described above. The thesis thus takes into account the identity of 
the states by analysing their relations. This means that the thesis will focus on both 
discursive and material power of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in this matter. However, this 
thesis puts more emphasis on the discursive element of power and treats it as an 
independent variable. 
 In order to analyse how the plans for the construction of the Rogun Dam have 
affected the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan a method needs to be developed. 
There exist different methods of analysing case studies. For this thesis is chosen for the 
“explanation building” analysis, developed by Robert K. Yin.34 The thesis aims to create a 
narrative on the case in order to explain causal links between the different events. First, in 
order to understand the interregional relations in Central Asia, regionalism in Central Asia 
will be discussed. This part also discusses the bilateral Tajik-Uzbek relations right after the 
fall of the Soviet Union. So first a narrative will provide us from the bigger picture of the 
relations in Central Asia and the bilateral relations of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
 The narrative is followed by an explanation of the Rogun Dam construction plans. 
This is followed by an analysis of how the Rogun Dam construction plans have affected 
how both countries construct their understanding of their bilateral relations. In order to 
research this, official statements will be used of both countries to see how their discourse on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 J. Moses and T.L. Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and 
Political Research, Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2007, 139.  
34 R.K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, SAGE Publications: Thousand 
Oaks, 2009, 141-144.	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the Rogun Dam developed. This is important because through their discourse both countries 
construct their political reality.  
 Different sources both in English and Russian will be used to gain the data used in 
this thesis. Since the WB conducted feasibility studies on the Rogun Dam, it published a lot 
of material on this specific issue. This information will be used for the thesis. Official 
statements on the Rogun Dam will also be retrieved from the official state sources of both 
countries, mainly from their Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Through the government 
websites, both countries have also published statements on the Rogun Dam issue to share 
with the general public. News sources will also be used in order to find statements made by 
both countries on the Rogun Dam. The reason that this thesis is also relying on news 
sources is because most news sources in both countries are state controlled.35 This means 
that statements are published that are in line with the government’s policies of both 
countries. Through different media these news agencies share public statements made by 
state officials with the general public. And last, this thesis will use information retrieved 
from independent organisations and news sources that provide information from the CAR. 
These include Eurasianet and The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. These sources are 
assumed to be reliable by this thesis, because they provide information independently from 
the ground. 
 The official statements that are discussed in this thesis show how the Rogun Dam 
construction plans are used in the discourse of both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and how this 
reflects their struggle for a new identity and eventually, how this affects their bilateral 
relations. Sometimes, statements are not shown on the official pages of the governments 
any longer, but different news media still quote statements that have earlier been made by 
the governments. In that case, this thesis still uses these quotes, since it was literally quoted 
from the state source and other media sources also published pieces of the statement.  
 By showing what both countries’ official responses were throughout the above 
mentioned period in the different stages of the planning process of resuming the 
construction of the Rogun Dam, one can conclude what the two countries wanted to report 
officially on the dam and how they constructed their bilateral relations through their 
discourse. Through this, one is able to conclude to what extent the Rogun Dam issue is used 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Freedom House, “Uzbekistan,” Accessed May 10, 2016 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/uzbekistan; Freedom House, 
“Tajikistan,” Accessed May 10, 2016 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
press/2015/tajikistan.     
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to construct a narrative around the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and 
whether the relation between both countries has become worse in the discourse because of 
the Rogun Dam construction plans. This can be measured in terms of action which follows 
after the discourse. Here we come back to the material power, which is discussed above.  
 The data, the official statements in this case, found, will be structured 
chronologically. The statements will thus be discussed per year in chapter four. The 
statements that are discussed, are all the official statements by both countries that can be 
found. This means that the thesis discusses every time the Rogun Dam was mentioned in 
official discourse over the course of 2012-2015. This results in a chronological overview of 
the events, which makes it easier for the researcher to look for continuity and change in the 
relations over the Rogun Dam construction plans between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.   
 So the discursive power of both countries will be analysed in order to see how both 
countries view the Rogun Dam construction plans and how the Rogun Dam is used in their 
discourse and whether their discourse is reflected in their material actions. It is assumed that 
the discursive power is derived from the identity of both countries, which is constituted by 
norms. Norms thus lead to identity, which could cause material actions of both Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan.  
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3. Central Asian relations after the fall of the Soviet Union 
 
The CAR became a very diverse region after the Central Asian states became independent. 
However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, it seemed obvious that the Central Asian states 
would cooperate and form a unified region. According to Annette Bohr and Marlene 
Laruelle, two scholars on Central Asian regionalism, there are several reasons to assume 
that they would work together as a region. First of all, the countries share a Soviet past and 
therefore they have a Soviet legacy of being economically and politically dependent upon 
each other.36 Second, the countries share some commonalities in their culture and history.37 
And third, the Central Asian states share problems and issues that are transboundary in 
nature since the fall of the Soviet Union, like water and energy issues. These issues need to 
be dealt with on a regional level since they pass political boundaries.38 However, up till the 
moment of writing, the CAR has not been acting like a unified region. Different attempts 
have been made in order to cooperate within the CAR. In this chapter these attempts will be 
discussed. First identity change within the CAR after the collapse of the Soviet Union will 
be discussed. This is followed by the integration frameworks that the Central Asian states 
have created and joined. Then the Tajik and Uzbek positions in the region and the bilateral 
relations between both countries since their independence will be discussed. 
 
3.1 Identity change in the post-Soviet era 
When the Soviet Union collapsed fifteen newly independent states emerged. The identities 
of these states went through a dramatic transformation with the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Whereas the Soviet republics shared an identity of being Soviet republics acting according 
to the communist ideology, which was imposed by the Soviet government, they shared 
similar interests. But while struggling with taking on a new identity as independent and 
sovereign states, the post-Soviet states appeared to develop diverging needs and interests.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse, “Regional Organisations in Central Asia: Patterns of 
Interaction, Dillemmas of Efficiency,” University of Central Asia, Institute of Public Policy 
and Administration, Working Paper No. 10 2012, 6; Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 
486.  
37 Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia,” 486. 
38 Laruelle and Peyrouse, “Regional organisations in Central Asia,” 6.  
39 R. Brubaker, “Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet 
Eurasia: An Institutionalist Account,” Theory and Society 23 (1994), 61-64; Bohr, 
“Regionalism in Central Asia,” 494-501.	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 This also appeared to be the case in the CAR. As the Central Asian states became 
independent, they developed all differently. The governments of the states promoted 
nationalism intensively in order to redefine the countries as independent states and to move 
away from their Soviet past.40 This caused that the Central Asian countries took different 
stances in regional issues. Identity appears to be a common issue in the CAR. This is also 
reflected in the regional cooperation frameworks in the CAR and in Tajik-Uzbek bilateral 
relations.  
 Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain mostly closed towards regional integration 
initiatives. Turkmenistan is the only Central Asian country that is publicly announcing that 
it is not interested in joining any regional cooperation structures.41 Since the fall of the 
Soviet Union the country has moved away from the former Soviet countries and oriented 
itself more towards Turkey and Iran.42 Turkmenistan has a clear stance towards 
regionalism; the country is not willingly to join any initiatives and chooses its own path. 
Uzbekistan is less clear in its stance towards regional integration, but has since the fall of 
the Soviet Union moved away from Russia and tries to cooperate with other countries at 
least as possible in order to retain its independence.43 This means that, since independence, 
both countries are not very interested in creating regional unity in the CAR. 
 In economic and security initiatives that have been taken in the years since the fall of 
the Soviet Union, both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been reluctant to join initiatives 
because of their independent identities. The other Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, always appear to join the regional integration frameworks. 
However, the fact that two of the Central Asian states are rather reluctant to cooperate on 
some matters is hampering cooperation within the region. Below there are some examples 
discussed on how regional integration frameworks are failing to create a regional unity in 
the CAR.  
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42 Ibid. 
43 D.R. Spechler and M.C. Spechler, “Uzbekistan among the Great Powers,” Communist 
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3.2 Regional integration efforts 
Economic integration efforts 
The only real Central Asian economical integration initiative was the creation of the Central 
Asian Union (CAU), although it did not include Turkmenistan. This organisation’s name 
has changed throughout time to the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) and 
eventually to the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO).44 However, in 2004 
Russia joined the CACO, which caused that the organisation was de facto dissolved and 
integrated into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) framework.45 The CAU was 
also the only economical organisation that was joined by Uzbekistan.  
 After this, some of the Central Asian states have attempted to join economical 
integration frameworks together with the traditional hegemon, Russia. These include the 
Customs Union (CU), which was created in 1994 by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia and 
later on joined by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 46 The CU was in 2000 transformed into the 
EurAsEC. 47 Recently, out of all these economic integration initiatives grew the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU), which was officially established in 2015.48 Tajikistan has shown 
interest in joining the EEU, but has not been accepted up till the moment of writing. 49 
Uzbekistan has not shown any interest at all in these Russia-led economic initiatives. This 
confirms that Uzbekistan tries to be independent within the region.  
Only the CAU included only Central Asian countries, but this organisation proved to 
be ineffective and therefore did not contribute to regional economic integration. The other 
initiatives included Russia and did not include all of the Central Asian countries. 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were mostly reluctant to join regional economic integration 
initiatives. At the moment of writing economic cooperation is still lacking in the CAR. 	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Asia,” Review of International Studies 35 (2009), 54. 
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diplomat. October 16, 2015, Accessed January 20, 2016,  
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Change in the identity caused by the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in diverging economic 
interests in the region. Uzbekistan has little interest in cooperating economically with the 
rest of the region. Within the frameworks, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan do not cooperate 
economically, because Uzbekistan does not join the initiatives. This is also reflected in the 
bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, since Uzbekistan also shows signs of 
lack of willingness to cooperate with Tajikistan on the Rogun Dam construction plans as 
shown in the next chapter.   
 
Security integration efforts 
In the field of security, the Central Asian states have also joined several initiatives after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. However, these initiatives are led by big powers outside the 
CAR, like Russia and China. One of them is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation 
(CSTO) was established as a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
security treaty, which included Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. 
Later on Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan also joined the CSTO.50 Although CSTO was 
joined by Uzbekistan, in 1999 the country withdrew from this framework when it diverted 
its foreign policy more towards the United States (US). Instead, Uzbekistan decided to join 
another organisation, the GUAM (Georgia Uzbekistan Armenia Moldova), in order to 
counter Russia’s power. In 2006, when the US military forces were ousted by Uzbekistan, 
Tashkent decided to join the CSTO again. However, Uzbekistan did not participate in many 
of the CSTO activities.51 Eventually in 2012, Uzbekistan decided again to withdraw its 
membership from the organisation.52 Again Uzbekistan shows its disinterest to join regional 
integration initiatives. Turkmenistan did not join this initiative at all and with that 
confirming its stance in the region as described above. 
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Another initiative in the field of security has been made after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, which also included China. In the mid 1990s Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, Russia and China organized several meetings in order to settle territorial disputes 
inherited from Soviet times. Out of these meetings grew the so-called “Shanghai Five” in 
1996, which transformed in 2001 in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).53 The 
SCO fostered closer cooperation in security issues between the Central Asian countries, 
China and Russia. The main goal of the organisation is to coordinate policies in fighting 
terrorism, separatism and extremism.54 Although it achieved some successes in fighting 
drug trafficking and border delimitation, it is mainly a China-led organisation. Furthermore, 
the organisation does not foster intraregional cooperation in Central Asia.55 Although the 
SCO is mainly built around the Central Asian states, the Central Asian players appear not 
the most important players.56 Moreover, this organisation is also not fostering regionalism 
in Central Asia. 
In the field of security, the Central Asian states have always cooperated with Russia 
in a framework since the fall of the Soviet Union. With the help of this traditional hegemon, 
the states succeeded in fighting external threats to some extent. However, the internal 
regional threats are still present. Another weakness of the security integration frameworks is 
that again, just like in the economic frameworks, not all Central Asian states are 
participating, or Uzbekistan which is every now and then participating and in all of them 
Russia is playing a leading role. Again Uzbekistan shows a lack of willingness to cooperate 
in security frameworks. 
 
3.3 Tajikistan’s position in the region 
As shown above, Tajikistan is rather eager to join regional cooperation initiatives. The 
country is economically the weakest country in the region and this is reflected in its position 
in the region. Tajikistan very much depends on other states for its existence and is therefore 
struggling to find its own identity and interests since the fall of the Soviet Union. The 	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country is the economically weakest state in Central Asia. Approximately half of its GDP 
comes from remittances and most of those remittances are coming from Russia.57 
Furthermore, Tajikistan is a fragile state after experiencing a civil war and because of 
internal struggles, it has been hard for Tajikistan to find its own identity.58 Within the CAR, 
Tajikistan struggles the most with its nation building process since the fall of the Soviet 
Union.59 This is reflected in the foreign policies of the country as shown above. Tajikistan 
joins almost every regional cooperation initiative to seek economic and military security 
with the help of other countries. Tajikistan thus needs other countries for its existence.  
 
3.4 Uzbekistan’s position in the region 
In the previous sections, it becomes clear that Uzbekistan rather isolates itself from the rest 
of the Central Asian states. Tashkent tried, since the fall of the Soviet Union, to take on an 
identity of regional hegemon. The country had a strong position in the region when the 
Soviet Union fell apart. This was caused, according to Ruth Deyermond, by two reasons. 
First of all, Uzbekistan had the largest armed forces in Central Asia. And second, 
Uzbekistan is positioned in a favourable geopolitical position, since the country borders all 
Central Asian states.60 Uzbekistan’s government even expressed its willingness to play a 
key role in the regional policies.61 Uzbekistan defines itself as an independent and leading 
player within the CAR. 
 In order to achieve its role as regional hegemon, Uzbekistan attempted to become 
independent from Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. As shown above, Uzbekistan did 
not actively participate in any of the Russian led regional initiatives. Basically, Uzbekistan 
tried to challenge Russian hegemony in the CAR. Later on, in 2004 and 2005, Uzbekistan 	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tried to improve relations with Russia again after the United States’ military forces were 
ousted by Tashkent.62 However, the relation with Russia is still rather unstable in the field 
of security and Uzbekistan tries to maintain its independent position from the other 
countries and still sees itself as strong player in the region. This is also reflected in its 
bilateral relations with Tajikistan.  
 
3.5 Tajik-Uzbek bilateral relations after the fall of the Soviet Union 
As discussed in the previous sections, the Central Asian states are struggling to cooperate 
because of the different identities they developed after the fall of the Soviet Union. This is 
also reflected in the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Since the fall of 
the Soviet Union, the two countries struggled to develop friendly and progressive bilateral 
relations. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan appear to differ greatly from each other in their views 
on regional cooperation as shown above. Uzbekistan is a strong player, which rather sees 
itself as an independent player within the region. Tajikistan is not able to be independent 
from the other countries in the CAR and in the post-Soviet space. This difference is one of 
the reasons Tajikistan and Uzbekistan lack good bilateral relations.  
 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, both countries did establish some bilateral 
agreements and contracts in order to foster the bilateral relations between the two countries. 
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, both countries 
enforced 111 contracts and agreements since 1992.63 Although both countries have these 
contracts and agreements, their bilateral relations have been affected negatively since the 
fall of the Soviet Union because of a series of events. Below these events are discussed. 
Uzbek involvement in the Tajik Civil War was one of the reasons that the bilateral 
relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was harmed after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
When the Civil War broke out in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan remained initially a neutral party. 
However, soon Uzbekistan became involved because of concerns that the violence would 
spill over to Uzbekistan.64 Russia and Uzbekistan initially became involved in favour of the 
government of Tajikistan. They also tried to foster dialogue between the opposition, the 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO), and the government. However, these opposition forces also 	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invaded Tajikistan, while they were first camped in Uzbekistan. Furthermore, it has been 
argued by the Tajik government that Uzbekistan aided the opposition militarily in the winter 
of 1995-1996. When an attempt was made to assassinate the president of Tajikistan, 
Emomali Rakhmonov, in 1997, Tajik authorities looked even more with a suspicious eye to 
Uzbekistan and its role in the Tajik civil war.65 This shows that soon after the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan already became worse because 
of Tajik accusations of Uzbek involvement in the Civil War. 
Another factor which harmed the relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was 
that president Rakhmonov openly stated in 2009 that Bukhara and Samarkand, both located 
within Uzbekistan’s political boundaries, actually belong to Tajikistan and that at some 
point Tajikistan will get these areas back. This issue is a Soviet legacy. In 1924, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan were turned into one administrative unit by the Soviet authorities. But in 
1929, the Soviet authorities split up this administrative unit into the Tajik SSR and the 
Uzbek SSR. During this period, nationalism also became important and the Soviet 
authorities attempted to draw national distinctions between the Tajik SSR and the Uzbek 
SSR.66 When they split up the area, Tajik-speaking Samarkand and Bukhara became part of 
the Uzbek SSR. Later on, the different cultures were supposed to melt into an overarching 
Soviet culture. However, in the 1970s, nationalism revived again in Central Asia and this is 
where the dispute between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan started. In the 1970s, scholars tried to 
define the Tajik history and ethnogenisis. During this process, some parts of this history and 
ethnogenesis crossed borders and overlapped with that of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
However, the Soviet government demanded the scholars not to cross borders in this 
process.67  When the Soviet Union collapsed, Samarkand and Bukhara became part of 
independent Uzbekistan. But in this part of Uzbekistan reside many ethnic Tajik, who also 
speak Tajik language.68 In that same period, nationalism became even more important. The 
newly independent states were seeking their national identity and promoting nationalism. In 
this process, Tajikistan still attempted to list heritage to UNESCO as theirs, which is located 	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within the borders of Uzbekistan for already more than 80 years.69 The Soviet legacy of 
border demarcation caused competition between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over heritage. 
 Security issues are also threatening the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. In 2000, relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan became tense again, 
because of Uzbek accusations that the terrorist group, IMU, was supported by the Tajik 
opposition within the coalition.70 This group was established in the beginning of the 1990s 
in Uzbekistan by Tahir Yuldashev. The party he created, the Adolat Party, was banned in 
March 1992 by the Uzbek authorities.71 After the party was banned, Yuldashev and his 
followers created their bases in Tajikistan.72 After the incursion of IMU militants into 
Uzbekistan in 2000 through the Tajik-Uzbek border, Karimov decided to close the Uzbek 
borders with the rest of Central Asia and even mined some parts of its borders with the rest 
of Central Asia, including Tajikistan.73 And in 2001, the Uzbek government introduced 
obligatory visas for Tajik citizens.74  
Relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan already appeared to be tense well 
before serious announcements were made of resuming the construction of the Rogun Dam 
by Tajikistan. Already within five years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the bilateral 
relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan became tense. One can already conclude that 
the bilateral relations between the two countries has not solely been negatively influenced 
by the Rogun Dam issue, but by their change in identity when looking at it from a 
constructivist lens. And this is not only the case for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but it is a 
common problem in the whole CAR, which causes a lack of willingness to cooperate. It is 
clear that Tajikistan as well as Uzbekistan think in national terms, and not in regional terms. 
From the start there existed distrust between the two countries because of newly developed 
interests after the fall of the Soviet Union. The relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
appears to have deeper-rooted problems in their relation that create competition and 
disputes. 
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4. Tajik-Uzbek official discourse on the Rogun Dam construction plans 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the CAR is nowadays rather characterized by 
disintegration. The change in their identity from Soviet republics to independent states 
caused diverging interests, which resulted in weakening cooperation within the region. This 
is also reflected in the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Since the fall 
of the Soviet Union, the two states appear to move away from each other instead of 
cooperating. This chapter focuses on the relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 
particular and how the plans to resume the construction of the Rogun Dam have been used 
in the discourse of both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan between 2012 and 2015. In order to 
analyse this, first the plans for the construction of the Rogun Dam will be discussed. This is 
followed by official statements made by both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan between 2012 and 
2015. The statements will be analysed through a constructivist approach as discussed in the 
second chapter.  
 
4.1 Rogun Dam construction plans 
One of the main problems in the region, which is caused by the lack of cooperation in the 
CAR, is the water-energy nexus. Since the fall of the Soviet Union there have been several 
disputes over water resources governance within the CAR. When the Soviet Union was still 
in place, the Central Asian states shared their water- and energy resources through a 
comprehensive system of exchange. Energy-poor upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were 
supposed to release enough water for the cotton-producing countries and energy-rich 
downstream countries, as there existed a so-called cotton monoculture in Central Asia, 
which was imposed by the Central Soviet government. In return, the energy-rich 
downstream countries provided the upstream countries with enough energy supplies.75  
When the Soviet Union fell apart, this exchange system also collapsed. At the 
beginning of their independence in the 1990s, the newly independent Central Asian states 
saw the need to work together on their natural resources, since the Soviet Union left a 
legacy of dependency in Central Asia. Therefore, all of the Central Asian states agreed upon 
maintaining the agreements of exchange like in the Soviet Union in the 1992 Almaty 
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Agreement (AA).76 However, soon it became clear that the confirmed quotas in the AA 
were not reflecting the situation at the time. The countries discovered that they had 
conflicting needs concerning the allocation of water.77 The energy-rich downstream 
countries started to sell their gas and oil resources for world market prices. This meant that 
the upstream energy-poor countries were also to pay these prices for the energy resources 
they lacked. The upstream countries lacked financial resources for the resources they lacked 
and therefore started to make plans for hydropower plants (HPP) and took other measures in 
order to prevent their countries from having energy shortages in winter.78 The diverging 
interests, which were caused by independence and sovereignty, resulted in weakened 
transboundary cooperation over the Central Asian water resources. 
The countries’ sovereignty meant that they, just like in the other issues, were more 
concerned with their own states’ interests than with cooperation over these resources. These 
diverging interests caused weakened cooperation over water- and energy resources in the 
region and in some cases even disputes erupted over water-and energy resources.  
 This is also the case with upstream Tajikistan and downstream Uzbekistan. 
Uzbekistan is an energy-rich country which is dependent on the water that is coming from 
Tajikistan because of its economic dependence on agriculture, especially its cotton 
production sector is still important for Uzbekistan’s economy.79 Moreover, water is an 
important feature for the Uzbek economy and therefore, Uzbekistan is dependent on 
Tajikistan’s water supplies. 
 Tajikistan, on the other hand, is also dependent on Uzbekistan for Uzbek gas 
deliveries. Tajikistan has a lot of water resources when compared to the other Central Asian 
states. The river Amu Darya, which is one of the main rivers of Central Asia, partly 
originates in Tajikistan. Only 16-18 per cent of the water is used by Tajikistan itself. The 
downstream countries use the rest of the water.80 However, the country has small gas 
resources, which are hard to extract. The country only produced 422 terajoule (TJ) in 	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2012.81 Because of the lack of energy resources, Tajikistan has an electricity shortage of 
approximately 5 billion kWh per year.82 Therefore, Tajikistan is dependent on gas deliveries 
from abroad, which are coming mainly from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, 
Tajikistan has the lowest income in Central Asia and is heavily dependent on remittances.83 
At the same time, Uzbekistan aimed to be self-sufficient in its oil and gas production from 
the mid 1990s. This meant that Uzbekistan formulated an energy strategy, which was 
created independently from the energy-consuming upstream countries, which do barely 
have energy resources plus they are economically weak.84 In 2009 this independent Uzbek 
path resulted in the withdrawal from the CAPS, on which Tajikistan was heavily dependent 
for its gas deliveries.85 Tajikistan’s dependence on Uzbekistan is a problem for its economic 
development, since it can not trust in this case on gas deliveries from Uzbekistan that are 
beneficially priced. Therefore, the country tried to seek energy independence.. 
In order for Tajikistan to generate more revenues and to become independent of 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in its energy supplies, the Tajik government decided to 
resume the construction of the Rogun Dam, a HPP located on the Vakhsh river basin, which 
is a major tributary of the Amu Darya river. It contributes 29 percent to the Amu Darya 
flows.86 The plans for the construction of the HPP had been made already in 1959 as part of 
the Vakhsh River cascade in order to overtake the Nurek dam, which is also located on the 
Vakhsh river. The construction of the Rogun Dam had started in 1976. But when the Soviet 
Union collapsed, the construction of the Dam was also halted due to the breakout of the 
Tajik Civil War in 1992, which lasted till 1997.87 In 2005 Tajikistan made the construction 
of the Rogun Dam a priority again. During that year, the Tajik government announced that 	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it would resume the construction of the dam with the financial assistance of RusAl, a 
Russian aluminum giant.88 However, after a few years, in 2007, RusAl and Tajikistan could 
not agree on the height of the dam. RusAl recommended a height of 285 meters, but the 
Tajik government decided to stick to the plan of constructing a 335 meters high dam and 
ended its cooperation with RusAl.89 But in 2008-2009, Tajikistan suffered from harsh 
winters and had severe electricity shortages. This meant that the construction of the dam 
became even a higher priority than before for the Tajik government.90  
As soon as Tajikistan announced its desire to resume the construction of the Rogun 
Dam, Uzbekistan expressed its concerns. Uzbekistan uses up to 90 percent of the quota, 
which is released by the upstream countries for irrigation purposes.91 When Tajikistan will 
use the Rogun Dam for the generation of electricity, Uzbekistan is concerned that it will 
receive less water for its irrigation purposes. Uzbekistan also raised concerns about the 
possibility of an earthquake, since the Rogun Dam will be located in a seismically active 
zone in Tajikistan.92 Here Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have conflicting interests; Tajikistan 
wants to generate hydropower in order to become energy independent, but Uzbekistan’s 
government raised its concerns about the consequences of the construction and operation of 
the Rogun Dam. 
 In order to convince the downstream countries to support the construction of the 
Rogun Dam, Tajikistan sought assistance on the international stage. In 2007, Tajikistan 
formally requested the WB to assess the feasibility of the construction and the operation of 
the Rogun Dam.93 In its report, the WB states that Uzbekistan was by this time also still 
interested in WB involvement in order to secure the safety of the dam project.94 The WB 
agreed and undertook feasibility studies by examining the risks and benefits of constructing 
the dam and of the operation of the dam. Tajikistan was not allowed to resume the 	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construction works before the WB would finish the feasibility studies. However, the 
assessment studies only serve as an input in the decision making process.95 In June 2014, 
the WB gave a positive opinion on the construction of Rogun Dam in Tajikistan with the 
publishing of the feasibility assessment. In the report it was said that the dam could operate 
while benefiting all parties involved, including Uzbekistan. It could both benefit the 
hydropower generation for Tajikistan and it could provide Uzbekistan of enough water for 
irrigation purposes.96  
However, the financing of the dam still remains a problem up to the moment of 
writing. Tajikistan would be able to finance the construction of the Rogun Dam by itself, 
but it will take its toll on the Tajik population, since it will cost approximately half of 
Tajikistan’s GDP of 2013. Therefore, the construction will need foreign investors. But in 
order to have reliable international partners to invest in the Rogun Dam project, Tajikistan 
needs to pursue a transparent public finance sector and a sound economic management. So 
far, the Tajik government proves to be unable to do so. The system is corrupt and its public 
institutions are weak.97 It thus remains to be seen whether Tajikistan will be able to actually 
resume the construction of the dam project. 
 
4.2 Viewpoints on the Rogun Dam 
Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have very different stances towards the construction of the 
Rogun Dam. This has not only to do with material reasons. At first sight, material reasons 
indeed seem to play a big role in the dispute over the dam project. However, these material 
reasons, like improvement of economic conditions or in the case of Uzbekistan, a less 
independent economy, lead us to the identity of both countries. With material means they 
are trying to protect their desired identity and position within the CAR. Identity thus plays, 
like in the entire CAR, a big role in how both countries perceive the construction plans of 
the Rogun Dam. Below the viewpoints of both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the Rogun 
Dam construction plans are discussed.  
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Tajikistan 
As noted above, Tajikistan aims to become energy independent from neighboring countries 
with the construction of the Rogun Dam in order to strengthen its position in the region. In 
Soviet times, the country was part of the Central Asian Power System (CAPS). This system 
divided the energy among the Central Asian states. However, this system collapsed in 2009 
when Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan withdrew from it. They prioritized selling gas resources 
for world market prices. This caused non-payments from the Tajik side, because the country 
was not able to pay these prices for gas, which led to electricity shortages.98 In order to 
avoid energy shortages, Tajikistan started to generate hydropower through the use of 
hydropower plants. Nowadays 94-98 per cent of Tajikistan’s electricity is generated by 
hydropower plants.99  However, in winter, these hydropower plants cannot operate in their 
full capacity. In summer, they produce electricity excess but because of a lack of 
sustainability, this excess is lost every year. When the Rogun Dam is in operation, it will 
increase the electricity production, which will help Tajikistan to become more independent 
from Uzbekistan.100 Tajikistan sees itself forced into relying on hydropower because of 
economic reasons, it seems. Tajikistan sees the Rogun Dam as a way of achieving energy 
independence and economic growth. 
Furthermore, Tajikistan’s economy is the weakest in the region and dependent on 
remittances for a big part. This could cause dissatisfaction among the Tajik peoples. In 
order to boost the Tajik economy, the Tajik government committed to the so-called CASA-
1000 project. This is a project, which aims to create an electricity market for Central Asia 
and South Asia. The countries that are involved are Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan.101 Tajikistan aims for the Rogun Dam to function as one of Tajikistan’s main 
sources of electricity for this project.102 Through this, Tajikistan would be able to receive 
more incomes through the Rogun Dam. The Tajik government thus sees the Rogun Dam as 
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a way out of its economic problems. The operation of the Rogun Dam might be a step 
forward to improve Tajikistan’s economic position in the region.  
A last reason why the Rogun Dam project is important for Tajikistan is because it 
would be able to help legitimizing the regime. As seen in the previous sections, the country 
suffered from turbulent times and struggles with defining itself as independent state, which 
also takes its toll on the Tajik peoples. Furthermore, the country suffered from harsh 
winters, which also caused suffering among the Tajik peoples. With the Rogun Dam 
operating, Tajikistan would be able to strengthen its position in the region and with that 
legitimize its regime. 
 
Uzbekistan 
As mentioned before, Uzbekistan tries to retain its independent position within the CAR 
and is highly dependent on its agricultural sector. Especially cotton and grain are important 
export products for the country. Approximately 28 per cent of the GDP is made up by the 
agricultural sector.103 Because of its dependence on this sector, Uzbekistan had concerns 
about how the Rogun Dam will affect the river flow of the Amu Darya, which is one of the 
main sources of water for Uzbekistan. Therefore, the country’s big concern is that the 
operation of the Rogun dam will cause less water for irrigation purposes. This would affect 
the Uzbek economy tremendously. Furthermore, the country is also concerned that 
Tajikistan will be able to control the water flows for political purposes.104 This is mainly 
caused by the mutual mistrust between the two countries, which is caused by problems 
between them well before the announcement of the resuming of the construction of the 
Rogun Dam project by Tajikistan. 
 Uzbekistan also showed its concerns about the location of the Rogun Dam. The Dam 
will be constructed in a seismic active area. If there is an earthquake, this will cause that the 
Rogun Dam might be destructed. This would be devastating for Uzbekistan, since big parts 
of the country will be flooded. This will also affect the economy negatively, which could 
affect Uzbekistan’s independent position within the CAR. Uzbekistan thus mainly fears the 
Rogun Dam will damage its agricultural sector when it finally operates. 
 When the Uzbek economy is doing worse, Tashkent might lose its independent 
position within the CAR. This is something the country also seems to attempt to avoid. One 	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could thus also state that Uzbekistan is not supporting the construction of the Rogun Dam, 
because it might affect the country’s independent position and identity. 
 
4.3 The Rogun Dam in Tajik and Uzbek discourse from 2012-2015 
From 2012, the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reached a new stage of conflict 
in their official discourse because of the Rogun Dam plans. In the literature it is stated that 
the Rogun Dam issue could result in a bigger conflict between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.105  
This part will analyze the different problems that occurred between the two countries and 
the statements from the two governments on the Rogun Dam between 2012 and 2015 in 
order to conclude how both countries have used the Rogun Dam issue in their discourse and 
how this creates their political reality on the international stage.  
 
Strong rivalry  
The reasons that 2012 is marked as a new height in the dispute over the dam, is because 
during that year the Rogun Dam was heavily discussed in the official discourse of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 2012, the gas supplies to Tajikistan were halted by 
Uzbekistan and this caused the Rogun Dam issue being discussed in the official discourse 
by both countries. The Tajik government connected the halt of the gas supplies to the 
Rogun Dam construction plans. 
On April 1, 2012, the gas supply to Tajikistan was completely cut off by Uzbekistan. 
Uzbek officials stated that the gas supply was halted, because the three-month contract 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had expired.106 Tajik Cement, a big Tajik company, was 
hit hard by the halt of gas supplies. Reuters reported that Tajik Cement was producing 
construction material for the Rogun Dam.107 Following this event, the Tajik government 
accused the Uzbek government for feeding the confrontation between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan by using different tools to pressure the Tajik government into taking decisions 
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that are complying with Uzbek foreign policy.108 The specific page on the website of the 
Tajik Embassy in Moscow in which this was stated has been deleted, but several news 
agencies quoted parts of the announcement.109 In the statement, it was literally stated that 
Uzbekistan is with these measures trying to obstruct the construction of the Rogun Dam: 
 
“The plans to construct hydropower projects on the inland waters, including the Rogun 
Dam, occupy a special place in the Tajik-Uzbek relations. Over the last couple of years, 
Uzbekistan tried to prevent the development of this important sector of Tajikistan’s 
economy by using far-fetched and unfounded pretexts. With that, Uzbekistan is in violation 
with the international law. Without consultation with its neighbouring countries, it is 
building tens of reservoirs, which allows the country to concentrate large volumes [of 
water] from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya and with that exerbating an already 
disastrous situation in the Aral (Sea) (…) The ultimate purpose of these steps of Uzbekistan 
is an attempt to mislead the international community and prevent the completion of the 
construction of this object.”110 
 
Not only is Tajikistan accusing Uzbekistan here from disrupting gas supplies in order to 
hinder the construction of the Rogun Dam, it also accuses the country from violating the 
international law by constructing reservoirs without consulting neighboring countries. From 
this quote, it becomes clear that Tajikistan was indeed suspicious about Uzbek pretenses to 
halt the gas supplies to Tajikistan. The Uzbek government responded that Uzbekistan’s 
actions are completely justified.111 From this official statement it becomes clear how highly 
politicized the Rogun Dam project has become in recent years. Even though the gas 
supplies were not linked directly to the Rogun Dam, but to an expired contract, Tajikistan’s 
government still linked it to the construction plans of the Rogun Dam. Tajikistan shows 
here how important the Rogun Dam has become for strengthening its position. 	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 In September of the same year, the president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, touched 
the Rogun subject in an official statement. He openly stated that the hydropower plants that 
both upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could lead to an armed conflict. During a visit of 
the president to Kazakhstan, Karimov stated that: "Water resources could become a 
problem in the future that could escalate tensions not only in our region, but on every 
continent (…)I won't name specific countries, but all of this could deteriorate to the point 
where not just serious confrontation, but even wars could be the result."112 In this statement, 
Karimov sounds warning about the plans of both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to construct 
their hydropower plants. Although he puts in a rather general way, he still points at both 
upstream countries by saying “I won’t name specific countries” in which he clearly pointed 
to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. From this statement, one can conclude that the Rogun Dam is 
an important issue in the relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is even such an 
important issue that Karimov found it necessary to mention it on a state visit to Kazakhstan.  
One could say that with this statement, the dispute over the Rogun Dam had reached a new 
height, since the Uzbek president threatens with material means to defend its position. Here 
it becomes clear that, like the constructivists argue, material power and discursive power are 
independent but connected, since one could lead to the other. 
 Tashkent also expressed its concerns on the construction of the Rogun Dam through 
a letter addressed to the WB. In this letter, Tashkent argued that the feasibility studies 
lacked some important considerations. Especially the risks on the downstream countries of 
the operation of the Rogun Dam were not taken well enough into account in the WB’s 
feasibility studies, according to Tashkent.113 Through this letter the Uzbek government 
expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the feasibility studies were carried out by the WB. 
This was another way to express dissatisfaction with plans for the construction of the Rogun 
Dam compared with the other ways in which, according to Dushanbe, Uzbekistan tried to 
obstruct the construction of the Rogun Dam. 
 The year 2012 appeared to be a year in which the issue on the Rogun Dam became 
tense and clearly affected the relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in a negative way. 
Discourse about the Rogun Dam has mainly been used by Tajikistan in order to accuse 
Uzbekistan from the use of tools in order to object the construction of the dam. From a 
constructivist lens, Tajikistan was here not confident of being able to develop its desired 
identity of becoming an independent and energy-exporting country. Uzbekistan even 	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referred to the possibility of material conflict between upstream and downstream countries 
and expressed its concerns about the construction plans for the Rogun Dam. Tashkent 
clearly felt threatened to maintain its independent identity within the CAR as Tajikistan was 
realizing the idea of the Rogun Dam. Here it also becomes clear how discursive power 
could lead to material action, since Uzbekistan threatened in its language with using 
material means. 
 
Tajikistan gains confidence 
In 2013, the Rogun Dam remained a subject of interest for both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
In February of 2013, the WB appeared to be cautiously positive about the construction of 
the Rogun Dam. During a Question and Answer (Q&A) session with Saroj Kumar Jha, the 
WB director of Central Asia, answered questions on the Rogun Dam. He stated the 
following during the session: “The interim findings from the presentations, reports and 
feedback from the Panels of Experts are that the dam type under consideration and stability 
of the slopes appear to be acceptable. “114 From this statement, it becomes clear that already 
in 2013, the WB became more positive about Tajikistan’s plans to resume the construction 
of the Rogun Dam. This gave the Tajik government more confidence in the Rogun matter.  
After the WB director of Central Asia made this statement this statement, United 
Nations (UN) Radio held interviews with government representatives from both Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. The first interview took place with a government representative of 
Tajikistan, Rakhmat Bobokalonov, in February 2013. During this interview, the issue with 
Uzbekistan was also shortly discussed. Bobokalonov did not say anything about the dispute 
with Uzbekistan over the Rogun Dam. He simply stated that experts are studying the 
feasibility of the Rogun Dam and that they will await the results. Furthermore, the official 
stated that the construction and operation of the dam will not affect other riparian states 
negatively.115 The statement is, unlike the statement that appeared a few months earlier, 
rather neutral. This Tajik official showed its confidence over the construction of the Rogun 
Dam, than concerns that Uzbekistan will block the construction of the Rogun Dam. This 
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can be considered as the result of the slightly cautious positive opinion of the WB on the 
construction plans of the Rogun Dam. 
 Through the same medium, an Uzbek official also was interviewed on the Rogun 
Dam. The Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources of Uzbekistan, Shovkat Khamraev, 
was during this interview sceptical about the Rogun Dam, especially about the WB 
feasibility studies to the Rogun Dam. He stated the following during the interview: 
 
“The World Bank should directly finance experts, but (the World Bank) gave money (to 
Tajikistan) for the research by international experts, but Tajikistan chose who it should 
conduct- They sign the bills themselves and pay themselves for their work.”116  
 
The quote again touches the WB feasibility studies, about which the Uzbek government 
earlier also expressed its concerns. From this quote it becomes clear that Tashkent did not 
see the WB feasibility studies as objective ones. He rather saw it as a way for Tajikistan to 
recruit their own experts, so it would work in the Tajik benefit, while Tajikistan is also the 
interested party of the dam project. This proves how much distrust there exists between 
Dushanbe and Tashkent. However, when the interviewer asked the minister whether it is 
possible that both sides will be satisfied he responded rather positive: 
 
“Of course there are options (…) We are for it that they (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) build 
small hydroelectric power stations, which do not change the water and environmental 
conditions of the rivers in the basin.”117 
 
Here Khamraev argues that under the condition that both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will 
build smaller hydropower plants, Uzbekistan would be satisfied with the construction of 
hydropower projects. In this way, Tashkent argued that both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan can 
be satisfied.  
 During the same interview, Khamraev also expressed its political concerns when the 
construction of Rogun Dam and other dams in Kyrgyzstan will be completed. He argued 
that with the big dams, upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan might be able to control the 
water flows for political purposes. This becomes evident in the following statement: “They 
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(Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) want to take the water management in their own hands. They 
want to control the rivers and dictate some unusual conditions.”118 
 
In the interview, the Tajik government representative appeared to be rather confident about 
the construction of the Rogun Dam. As a response to this, the Uzbek representative showed 
its concerns about the consequences on the downstream countries of the construction of big 
dam projects in the region. The concern that the upstream countries might use the dams for 
political purposes towards the downstream countries appeared to be the strongest concern in 
the interview with the Uzbek minister.  
 The Uzbek government also addressed its concerns about the Rogun Dam to the UN 
General Assembly. In this address, the country again showed its concerns of the plans to 
resume the construction of the Rogun Dam. The Uzbek government stated that the plans 
shall lead to “a disruption of the natural flow (of the rivers).”119 Uzbekistan mainly 
expressed its concerns about the Rogun Dam’s effect when it will be operating through its 
official statements. 
 One could conclude that the dispute over the Rogun Dam took a new shape in 2013. 
Whereas in 2012 Tajikistan accused Uzbekistan for using material means to obstruct the 
construction of the Rogun Dam, Tajikistan became more confident about the realization of 
the construction plans in 2013. This changed the Tajik position in the dispute, since 
Dushanbe slowly seemed to gain international support for its mega project. This supported 
the Tajik’s aim to become a stronger player in the CAR and with that, Dushanbe seemed to 
feel less threatened in defending its identity. There were actually more prospects that 
Tajikistan would realize the construction of the Rogun Dam and therefore Dushanbe 
probably softened its tone towards Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s position also changed 
significantly. Tashkent now expressed its concerns based on feasibility studies of the Rogun 
Dam, instead of using material means for the obstruction of the Rogun Dam. One could 
conclude that the discourse on the Rogun dam became softer. 
 
Strong Uzbek opposition 
In 2014, the WB finished its feasibility studies. In June of that year, the WB gave a positive 
opinion on the construction of the Rogun Dam in its draft report on the Dam’s feasibility. It 
stated that, if the Rogun Dam was in operation and used in the way on which was agreed 	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during the feasibility studies, both upstream and downstream countries would benefit from 
the operation of the Rogun Dam.120 This meant that Tajikistan was gaining more 
international support for resuming the construction of its long awaited mega dam project. 
However, the financing of the dam project, as mentioned before, was still a point of 
concern. The WB also stated this in its draft report on the feasibility of the Dam.121 
However, in an official statement by Tashkent, published on its official government website 
and sent to the WB by the Uzbek government, Tashkent stated that it did not agree with the 
WB feasibility studies. The feasibility studies were considered as unreliable by the Uzbek 
government, because according to Tashkent there was no equal treatment of all interested 
parties. Tajikistan played a primary role in the studies, while this is the party that wants to 
construct the Rogun Dam. Furthermore, the Uzbek government stated that the 
environmental impact and the impact on the run-off conditions of the Amu Darya were not 
evaluated significantly. The Uzbek government also stated that it gave notice of these issues 
timely, but that the WB did not take its views into account during the process. In the last 
part, Tashkent suggests that better studies will be carried out on the feasibility of the Rogun 
Dam project and it recommends building smaller hydropower plants instead of a big dam 
project.122 Azimov also underlined the potential for conflict if such structures like the 
Rogun Dam are contstructed: “taking into account the extreme water scarcity in Central 
Asia, this mechanism can be converted into explicit tool of political pressure on 
downstream countries, provoking escalation of confrontation and growth of conflict 
potential in the region.”123 Uzbekistan appeared not to support the feasibility studies that 
were undertaken by the WB, although at first the country was rather supportive of the WB 
feasibility studies when they commenced. With this statement, the Uzbek government 
expressed its fierce objection to the construction of the Rogun Dam with arguments based 
on the reliability of the studies undertaken by the WB. Tashkent also underlined how the 
Dam can be used as a political tool by Tajikistan, which could result in conflict in Central 
Asia. Again Tashkent warns for a material conflict. 
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 After the WB feasibility studies were published, Uzbekistan’s stance became again 
more negative towards the construction plans. Whereas Tashkent still had a feeling it could 
influence the WB feasibility report by criticizing it, in 2014, this appeared not to be the case 
and therefore Tashkent’s opposition to the Rogun Dam construction plans grew again. 
Uzbekistan saw the need to defend its independent position and identity within the CAR.  
 
Softening relations? 
After the harsh statement of Tashkent after the publishing of the WB feasibility studies, 
Uzbek authorities did not mention the Dam for a while in official statements. It even 
seemed that the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were getting better. 
Different sources wrote of a so-called détente between the two countries.124 This détente 
discourse about the relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had several reasons. During 
a meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in Dushanbe, 
transport between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan was discussed. Furthermore, cooperation on 
gas resources was discussed again, which had halted in 2012.125 The Tajik government also 
announced the establishment of a Tajik-Uzbek Friendship and Cooperation Group.126 These 
developments are all proof of an improving relation between the two Tashkent and 
Dushanbe. On July 22, 2015 the Tajik Minister of Energy and Water Resources Usmonali 
Usmonzoda even claimed that Uzbekistan did not have any objections anymore against the 
construction of the Rogun Dam.127 However, this statement seems to have been a false 
claim by Dushanbe, because Tashkent responded to this statement that it still fiercely 
opposes the construction of the Dam. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan even 
republished its statements that it made in 2014 as a response to the WB feasibility studies. 
In the statement the Uzbek government stated that Uzbekistan’s position has not changed 
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since.128 Despite the fact that the relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were getting 
increasingly friendly on other issues in their bilateral relations, Uzbekistan still objected the 
construction of the Rogun Dam. 
 This shows that the Rogun construction plans it self did not immediately affect the 
relation between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan anymore, although the discourse on the Rogun 
Dam by both countries shows differently. After the WB feasibility studies were finalized, 
Dushanbe and Tashkent appeared to be able to improve their bilateral relations again 
without resolving the Rogun Dam issue. This could be the case because although Tajikistan 
got prove from international consultants that the Rogun Dam is feasible, Tajikistan still 
struggled with finding financial resources for the dam project. This indicates that the 
construction of the Rogun Dam will not be completed in the near future. As long as 
Tajikistan is not planning on finalizing the project, Uzbekistan’s position in the region is 
not threatened by Tajikistan’s growing strength in the region. 
At first, the Rogun Dam was not an issue of international concern, but when 
Tajikistan requested WB involvement, the issue of the Rogun Dam became 
internationalized. The more the WB became involved and the more positive the Bank 
became about the feasibility of the construction of the Rogun Dam, the more confident 
Tajikistan became it its public statements on the Dam project. Whereas in 2012, Tajikistan 
accused Uzbekistan for its obstruction of the construction of the Rogun Dam by blocking 
the railroad and halting gas supplies, the country became less negative towards Uzbekistan 
when the WB became more positive about the project. Uzbekistan mainly used its worries 
in its discourse on the Rogun Dam as a way to oppose the construction of the dam project. 
In the discourse of both countries, the Rogun Dam was mainly another tool to jeopardize 
the other country in a deeper-rooted conflict. The Rogun Dam project plans have become a 
big issue between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, but the Rogun Dam project is not the root of 
the problems between the two countries. Deeper-rooted conflicts between both states are 
rather mirrored in the Rogun Dam issue.  
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4.4 Constructivist analysis  
The Rogun Dam issue is basically a struggle of power about national identities, when 
looking at the issue from a constructivist lens. As seen in the previous chapter, identity is a 
common issue in the CAR. Because of newly developed identities and interests, which are 
diverging, cooperation within the region is lacking. The Rogun Dam issue became highly 
politicized because of the discourse on the issue by both countries. 
 Tajikistan needs a stronger position, since the country is rather a weak player in the 
region whose identity has slowly developed, but not completed after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Tajikistan remains a fragile state with a very diverse ethnic composition.129 This 
makes it hard for the country to create a national idea and unity among its population. 
According to Filippo Menga, a specialist on hydropolitics, dams can play a significant part 
in the nation-building process of countries. They can function as symbols for society, 
because they provide the nation from its needs.130 In this case, the Rogun Dam could 
provide the Tajik peoples from enough electricity and economic growth, which would result 
in a wealthier society and a more satisfied society, which legitimizes the regime of the 
country. One could thus say that the Rogun Dam plays a significant part in the nation-
building process of Tajikistan after experiencing turbulent times, which halted the nation-
building process. Sufficient electricity and economic growth may contribute to the creation 
of unity in Tajikistan. The Tajik government also promotes this idea heavily within Tajik 
society.131 Therefore, the construction of the Rogun Dam gains even more importance for 
the Tajik government and society. Identity appears to play a big role in the desire to 
construct the Rogun Dam. The Rogun Dam is a tool for Dushanbe to create unity and 
welfare in Tajikistan. 
For Uzbekistan, however, the Rogun Dam rather poses a threat to retaining an 
independent position within the CAR. Uzbekistan has a unique position in the CAR as the 
country borders all other Central Asian states. Therefore, the country assumes to have a so-
called “special” position in the region and sees the need to take on a role, which carries 
more responsibility in the region than other countries because of its geographical position in 
the region.132 This special role can be taken as the desire to become the regional hegemon. 	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As noted in the previous chapter, Uzbekistan is also the biggest military power in the 
region. In this thesis, it is indeed assumed that Uzbekistan desires to be the regional 
hegemon. And this is clearly reflected in its stance towards the Rogun Dam construction 
plans. When Tajikistan is growing stronger because of economic growth and the creation of 
national unity, this could pose a threat to Uzbekistan’s position in the region. Without the 
Rogun Dam, Tajikistan still depends on other countries and remains a weak player in the 
region. But when Tajikistan’s position in the region would strengthen, Uzbekistan is losing 
its grip over the Central Asian countries. According to Roman Muzalevsky, the Rogun Dam 
poses a threat to Uzbekistan’s leverage over Tajikistan in the region.133 In order for 
Tashkent to develop its identity as regional hegemon, it needs to counter any developments 
in the region that could cause a decline in its regional power.  
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to find out to what extent the discourse around the Rogun Dam issue 
by Tajikistan and Uzbekistan invokes conflict rhetoric in their bilateral relations. One can 
conclude that the Rogun Dam has primarily been used in the discourse of both Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan in order to defend their positions and identities within the region. Tajikistan 
clearly seeks to strengthen its position in the region while Uzbekistan aims a position as 
regional hegemon, or at least retain a position of independence within the CAR. The plans 
to resume the construction of the Rogun Dam influenced the discourse between the two 
countries on the subject, because it poses a threat to the Uzbek position in the region and it 
could be a tool to strengthen the Tajik position in the CAR.  
 From the previous sections, it appeared that all of the Central Asian countries 
struggle to cooperate as a unified region since the fall of the Soviet Union because of the 
diverging interests which they developed according to the new identities they took on in the 
post-Soviet period. This was also reflected in the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan and the Rogun Dam issue. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are since the demise of the 
Soviet Union also cooperating on a limited scale. Since 1991, several issues in their 
bilateral relations developed. Right after the Tajik Civil War, Tajikistan distrusted 
Uzbekistan already. Furthermore, Tajikistan claims that some of the territory that is within 
the Uzbek borders, actually belongs to Tajikistan. Terrorism also jeopardized the bilateral 
relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There thus already existed issues in the Tajik-
Uzbek bilateral relations well before the plans to resume the construction of the Rogun Dam 
were announced. 
 When Tajikistan announced its plans to resume the construction of the Rogun Dam, 
Uzbekistan approached these plans with concerns and therefore the WB was asked to 
undertake feasibility studies on the dam. In 2012 both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan developed 
a strong rivalry towards each other with regard to the Rogun Dam construction plans. 
Dushanbe saw the Uzbek halt of gas supplies as an attempt to obstruct the Rogun Dam 
construction plans and president Karimov even threatened with the possibility of an armed 
conflict if plans such as the Rogun Dam plans are pushed through. One could say at this 
point that the Rogun Dam issue was one of the bigger issues between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.  
 In 2013, the tones of both countries softened increasingly. There were no more 
threats of the use of material means. Tajikistan gained more confidence on the Rogun Dam 
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project as the WB results appeared to be cautiously positive. However, Uzbekistan started 
to express its concerns on the reliability of the feasibility studies as a way to oppose the 
Rogun Dam construction plans.  
 In 2014, the WB published the feasibility studies and gave a positive opinion on the 
construction plans. Uzbekistan responded to the studies in an obstructive way. It stated that 
the feasibility studies were unreliable. Tashkent also highlighted how Tajikistan could be 
able to use the Rogun Dam as a political tool to downstream countries.  
 In 2015, there appeared to be some positive developments in the bilateral relations 
between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. More cooperation between both countries evolved. But 
when Tajikistan claimed that Tashkent no longer opposed the Rogun Dam construction 
plans, Uzbekistan stated that it still fiercely opposed the plans.  
 Although the discourse on the Rogun Dam has been fiercely oppositional by 
Uzbekistan, it did not appear to jeopardize the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan anymore after the WB feasibility studies were finished. The official discourse of 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the Rogun Dam did not lead to stronger rivalry between the 
two countries overall. The discourse on the Rogun Dam by both countries did not lead to 
material actions by one of the states and did not invoke conflict rhetoric, according to this 
research. Tashkent in 2015 still stated it was fiercely against the construction of the Rogun 
Dam, but the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have improved since the 
WB finished its feasibility studies as both countries were approaching each other in other 
areas than water-and energy issues. 
 Tajikistan appeared in its discourse on the Rogun Dam in the first part of the period 
researched to express itself rather in an offensive way towards Uzbekistan. This shows how 
important the construction of the dam project is to Dushanbe. As noted in the thesis, the 
Rogun Dam is used by Tajikistan to create a new national identity in order legitimize the 
regime. But when Dushanbe gained more confidence when international players became 
involved in the matter, it softened its tone towards Uzbekistan, since Dushanbe became 
more convinced of international support for the Rogun Dam construction plans.  
 Moreover, at first the discourse on the Rogun Dam seemed to create more 
competition between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan when the WB was still in the process of 
undertaking the feasibility studies on the Rogun Dam. Indeed, it looked like the Rogun Dam 
issue was getting a fierce battle between both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the literature that has been written up till the moment of writing states that 
the Rogun Dam issue is one of the bigger issues in the bilateral relations between Tajikistan 
	   45	  
and Uzbekistan. But the issue did not lead to any material action. Also, as time passed and 
as the feasibility studies progressed, the Rogun Dam did not seem to be such a big issue 
anymore in the bilateral relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as before. The 
discourse on the Rogun Dam by both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan did not jeopardize the 
bilateral relations, since both countries recently have been able to expand their bilateral 
relations with each other. Therefore, this thesis does not expect the Rogun Dam to pose a 
threat to the bilateral relations of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the near future. However, it 
is remained to be seen whether the Rogun Dam will eventually be constructed and how 
Tashkent will respond to this. Up till the moment of writing, Tajikistan still struggles with 
finding financial resources to realize the construction plans. If the dam project actually will 
be constructed, it is not clear how Tashkent will respond to this, since it recently still stated 
it is fiercely opposing the construction of the Rogun Dam.  
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